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1. Policy Instruments
In France, monetary policy is conducted by the National Credit Coun-
cil, which is nominally headed by the Minister of Finance, while the
Governor of the Bank of France serves as Vice President. As a rule,
however, the Minister is absent from the Council's meetings, and the
operation of the Council is directed by the Bank's Governor. Although
the Bank is theoretically only the executive agency of the Council,
carrying out the latter's policy, in practice the Bank of France brings
recommendations for policy actions before the Council, and the Coun-
cil's staff is provided by the Bank. The Council may thus be viewed as
the means by which the Bank of France submits its suggestions to rep-
resentatives of the public and the banking community for approval,
and by which it coordinates its policy with that of the' government,
particularly the Ministry of Finance. In this way, the Bank of France
enjoys a smaller of formal independence than do most central
banks, but this does not mean.that the Bank is in a-subordinate posi-
tion:it probably wields greater influence on the operation of other
government organs than do central banks in most other countries.
While there are many deposit banking facilities in France, banking
is quite concentrated, both in number of banks and in location; the
greater part of banking transactions is conducted by seven banks, only
one of which has its headquarters outside Paris. More than half of
the banking business, measured by the amount of deposits or by total
assets, is concentrated in the four largest banks, all of them in Paris.
These four banks have been nationalized since the end of World War
II, yet they still operate as private enterprises. Despite the high degree
of concentration and the nationalization of banking establishments,
there are no indications that informal associations within the banking96 DEMAND POLICIES AND BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
community, or "moral suasion" by the central bank, play an impor-
tant part in the conduct of monetary policy in France.
The Bank of France uses all of the classical monetary instruments,
but in forms and combinations that are uniquely its own.
Discount Policy. Rediscount policy—effected through changes in the
discount rate and in rediscounting quotas—is the major instrument of
monetary policy in France. Because of the massive amount of redis-
counting at the Bank of France, changes in the discount rate are bound
to be effective, for they operate on both the supply of credit and the
demand for it. A semi-rigid relationship is maintained, by regulation,
between the discount rate and the commercial banks' interest rates on
customer loans. Formerly, the difference between the interest rates and
the discount rate was fixed; a change in the discount rate thus led to a
similar change in rates charged by commercial banks, leading in turn
to a change in the amount of credit demanded by the public. Since No-
vember 1963, however, the regulations allow the commercial banks'
lending rates to change only half as much as the discount rate changes.1
A change in the discount rate thus affects the profitability of commer-
cial banks' credit transactions (combined with rediscounting) and the
supply of credit.
Since 1948, discount policy has also included the establishment of a
ceiling for each bank, up to which it can discount at the Bank of France
at the basic discount rate. Further rediscounting (or selling paper to
the Bank of France with a repurchase stipulation) within a limit of
10 per cent of the discount quotas has been allowed since 1951, but
a penalty rate, higher than the basic discount rate, is applied to such
transactions. Since 1957, still further discounting has been permitted
at a second, higher, penalty rate. Both changes in the ceilings and
changes in the penalty rates are among the discount policy measures
used. Unlike the situation in a country like Japan, where the basic dis-
count rate was rather meaningless during most of the period in which
penalty rates were in effect, it appears that in France the basic rate has
been significant; that is, for most discounting transactions, this basic
discount rate is relevant at the margin. Discounting at the penalty rates
is usually taken only for brief periods, as a last resort; the very high
level of the penalty rates forces the banks generally to stay within their
basic rediscounting quotas.
1 This change in the relationship between the rates was officially introduced
in early 1960, but from then until late 1963 the change was applicable only to
discount-rate movements outside the range of 3.5to4.5percent, and in fact
the discount rate remained within this range during those years.FRANCE 97
Reserve Requirements. The minimum-reserve requirements custom-
ary in most countries—requirements for, the holding of deposits at the
central bank, or cash, at a certain ratio to designated bank liabilities—
did not 'exist in France during the period under review. Usually, com-
mercial banks in Fiance have maintained only small working balances
at the Bank of France—not more than 2 to 3 per cent of their deposit
liabilities. There have been, however, liquidity requirements of a some-
what different form considered secondary to, and intended mainly for
the support of, rediscounting policy.
When the rediscount ceilings were introduced in September 1948,
commercial banks held sizable amounts of Treasury bills. By selling
these, the banks could have overcome the restrictive effect of the limi-
tations imposed on rediscounting by the ceilings. In order to prevent
such circumvention, the rediscount ceilings were accompanied by
Treasury-bill "floors": banks were required to hold Treasury bills to
the value of a given minimum amount. At first, each bank was re-
quired to maintain the amount of Treasury bills in its portfolio at the
time the system was introduced; for all commercial banks at that time,
the average was 28 per cent of designated liabilities. Each bank was
also required to hold additional bills to the value of 20 per cent ot
the increase in its designated liabilities since the base date. In 1956
this mixture was replaced by a uniform ratio of 25 per cent of all
liabilities, 'which was the average ratio for all commercial banks.
Early in 1961, a more inclusive reserve requirement was introduced.
Under the new regulation, the banks were required to maintain port-
folios of several types of assets, including the Treasury bills held under
the floor regulation, at a given minimum ratio to the liabilities specified
under the floor regulation. In addition to Treasury bills, these assets
include certain commercial bills, all of which can be discounted at the
Bank of France beyond the limitations of the ceilings under the exist-
ing regulations. Thus, this measure, too, was enacted as a supplement
to discounting policy. Because of these., new reserve requirements, the
floor regulation ceased to be a necessary part of monetary policy, and
changes in floor ratios were thereafter determined primarily by the
needs of the Treasury. Consequently, the floor ratio has, gradually and
substantially, declined from the level of 25 per cent at which it was
maintained before 1961 •2
2 Thesystem of floor ratios and reserve requirements described here was re-
placed in 1967 by a system of reserve ratios in which deposits at the Bank of
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Open-Market Policy. Open-market operations have been a minor,
subsidiary part of the management of French monetary policy. Banks
were assigned open-market quotas which gave them limited recourse
to open-market selling before starting to rediscount at the Bank of
France at the penalty rates. In effect, then, open-market operations did
not function as an independent instrument, but rather as part of the
discounting mechanism.
Other Measures. The Bank of France has considerable power to in-
tervene in the granting of credit by commercial banks; to grant various
forms of credit, beyond some given size of transaction, the banks must'
obtain prior authorization from the Bank of France. This regulation
has been used to control the allocation of credit, i.e., to discourage
lending to certain industries, and encourage lending to others, but not,
apparently, as an instrument of general monetary policy. Monetary cir-
cumstances influenced the regulation of instalment credit, but there is
not enough of this instalment credit in France for direct intervention
by the Bank of France in that area to make any substantial impact on
the total amount of credit.
On occasion, however, direct control has been exercised over the
credit volume. From February 1958 to February 1959, the total
amount of credit which could be granted by each bank was frozen by
directive of the monetary authorities at its level for the last quarter
of 1957; expansion up to 3 per cent df that base was permitted only
when credit for exports was concerned. Direct control was introduced
again in early 1963, and was maintained throughout the rest of the
period.
FISCAL POLICY AND THE TREASURY'S
FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS
S
Becauseof the Treasury's functions and the structure of its operations,
its role in French economic life is rather complicated. The French gov-
ernment's budget is divided into two parts. One, by far the larger, in-
cludes "permanent items." On the expenditure side, this includes the
government's real transactions and transfer payments; on the revenue
side, it covers taxes and similar items. Generally speaking, this part
of the budget is roughly balanced. The other part includes "tempo-
rary items," and essentially consists only of payments in the form of
loans granted by the government (net of repayments), primarily for
development purposes. These loans (the acquisition of financial assets)
are financed mostly by sales of various government financial obliga-FRANCE 99
tions; but the proceeds from these transactions are not recorded as
revenue in the budget. The temporarry-items part of the budget, hence
the budget as a whole, thus necessarily shows a deficit, roughly the size
of the expenditures on temporary items. This deficit does not therefore
indicate the government's "excess demand," which would approxi-
mately correspond to a deficit in the budget of permanent items.
As is implied above, the is heavily involved in the capital
market, mainly in the sale of Treasrury bills. These are of two kinds:
"paper" bills are sold to savings institutions and other firms and to
households in order to channel savings through the government; "cur-
rent account" bills are the Treasury bills sold to commercial banks.
Since the banks are compelled to buy the latter under the "floor", regu-
lations, there is strong incentive for the Treasury to set low yields for
the bills; consequently, the banks tend to invest as little as possible in
Treasury bills. As a rule, then, the amount of acquisition (or dispo-
sition) of Treasury bills by commercial banks is determined by changes
in their deposit liabilities and the floor ratio. During the last few years
of the period surveyed, the strong financial position of the government
led to a marked decline in the amount of outstanding Treasury bills
which, in turn, made possible the abolition of the floor requirement in
1967.
The Treasury also influences the monetary situation in many other
ways. It holds large sums on deposit for individuals, firms, special
agencies, and governmental units, such as local authorities, and the
governments of overseas members of the franc area. Some of these de-
posits, such as those widely held in the postal system, are even con-
sidered part of the French money supply. Changes in these accounts
will, in turn, be reflected in the accounts at the Bank of
France, for the Treasury does not maintain deposits in commercial
banks.
It is clear that while the government's deficit, and changes in it, must
be related to the government's net indebtedness to the Bank of France,
there is no necessary correspondence between the two. The latter re-
flects not only the size of the deficit but also the form in which it is
financed (whether by sales of Treasury bills or by a change in the
government's indebtedness to the Bank) and changes in the Treasury's
monetary accounts, some of which move independently, while others
are related directly to the budget.3
8Animportant instance of the latter case is given by budgetary allocations to
governments of other countries of the franc area, which are accomplished by
crediting the account of the government concerned at the Treasury, and do not100DEMAND POLICIES AND BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
It is also clear that neither the budgetary balance nor changes in the
government's net indebtedness to the Bank of France accurately re-
flect the expansionary or contractionary impact of the government's
transactions. For the reasons just explained, the cash deficit, as it is
measured, does not represent the government's excess demand, while
the change in the government's indebtedness to the Bank does not
take into account the effect of changes in accounts held at the Treasury,
and thus does not fully represent the effect of the government on the
economy's liquidity.
2. Statistical Analysis
The study of monetary and fiscal reactions to balance-of-payments
disturbances in France is restricted to a rather small number of ob-
servations. For about half of the total period—from the beginning of
1959 to the end of 1 966—the balance of payments showed continuous
surpluses, and external reserves increased monotonically. Episodes of
balance-of-payments fluctuations are thus limited to the 1950's. Never-
theless, conclusions are suggested by the data.
First, as may be seen from Chart 5-1 and from column 2 of Table
5-1, movements of the discount rate appear consistently in the direc-
tion indicated by the need for balance-of-payments adjustment. This is
certainly true for the years 1950—60; in later years, there were hardly
any movements in the discount rate—only two minor changes in 1963
and 1965—and the changes were apparently unrelated to the move-
ments of external reserves.
This impression is supported by Table 5-2, in which all changes in
the discount rate are recorded. From column 1, it may be seen that
almost all of these changes were in the direction required for balance-
of-payments adjustment. The single apparent exception during the
1950's is the lowering of the discount rate in the third quarter of 1953,
when external reserves were falling. The fall of reserves during that
quarter was, however, minor; moreover, when the discount rate was
give rise to any immediate change in the Treasury's accounts at the Bank of
France. In the longer run, however, these allocations will take the form of an
excess of imports from France by the country concerned. This, in turn, must
be reflected in a transfer of accounts at the Treasury from the foreign govern-
ment to a French bank, which will lead to an increase in bank liquidity and cor-
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NOTE:Diagonal-line areas represent period of downward imbalances; gray areas repre-
sent stability; white areas represent upward imbalances.
actually changed, in September 1953, external reserves were already
slightly rising. This episode thus cannot be considered an exception
either.
Table 5-2 also provides an indication of the influence of targets other
than the balance of payments on the movements of the discount rate.
Unemployment, even at its peaks, was so low throughout the period
that its fluctuations could not conceivably bring about monetary policy
reactions. Table 5-2 is therefore confined to two other target variables.
The rate of change of industrial production is represented in column
2; movements of the discount rate show no consistent association with
this variable. But the rate of change of the cost-of-living index (column
3) seems to perform quite well. It appears that, on the whole, there
was no contradiction between the requirements of balance-of-payments
equilibrium and those of price stability. A fall of external reserves was
more often than not accompanied by a greater than usual increase in
prices, so that both targets required (or did not contradict the need
for) an increase in the discount rate, whereas the opposite was usually


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































FRANCE: CHANGES IN THE DISCOUNT RATE AND












Iv 1951 + fall * normal + high
u 1957
m 1957
+ fall —low —low
+ fall — low * normal
iv 1963 — rise * normal + high
Lowered:
n 1950 + rise + low + low
m 1953 — fall + low + low
i 1954 + rise — high + low
iv 1954 + rise — high + low
Iv 1958 * stable + low * normal
i 1959 + rise + low * normal
ii 1959 + rise * normal * normal
iv 1960 + rise — high + low
ii 1965 + rise + low * normal
Nom: For explanation of symbols, see Chapter 3, explanatory note.
The long period of continuously rising external reserves deserves a
special examination. During most of this period—throughout the
1960's—the discount rate was practically stable, while balance-of-
payments adjustment would have called for a lowering of the rate.
It is conceivable, however, that even though the discount rate was al-
most stable during these years, its level may have been determined by a
consideration of the fact that the balance of payments was in a con-
tinuous surplus. If this is true, the level of the discount rate would be
low, in comparison with other periods, but this is not what actually
took place. The average, almost stable, level of the discount rate from
1960 or 1961 onward was about the same as the average, much more
fluctuating, level of the rate during the 1950's. Therefore, by this yard-
stick, too, discount-rate policy cannot be s.aid to have conformed to
the requirements of balance-of-payments equilibrium during the 1960's.
But, as the analysis of the over-all view in Chapter. 2 has shown, aio6DEMAND POLICIES AND BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
different conclusion is reached when the rising trend of discount rates
in other countries is taken into consideration: in relation to rates else-
where, the discount rate in France was indeed lowered during the
1960's.
It may be worthwhile to inquire whether the level of external reserves
fulfilled a function in the determination of discount-rate policy. If it
did, reversals of policy should follow, in general, reversals of move-
ments of external reserves only after the latter have persisted over a
long period of time, so that this cumulative effect on the level of re-
serves is significant. By and large, this does not seem to be the case.
The only important episode in which the policy pattern would conform
to this hypothesis is that of 1956—58. The decline of reserves in this
period followed a very sharp increase which brought reserves to a high
level. Indeed, discount-rate policy came to be restrictive only in the
second quarter of 1957, after a sharp decline of reserves had already
been in progress for a year and a half. But, contrary to the hypothesis
under examination, discount-rate policy became expansive at the end
of 1958, continued to be expansive in 1959, while reserves were rising
but still below their 1955 peak. From the middle of 1959, the discount
rate remained almost stable while reserves were rising rapidly and sur-
passing by far any previous level. In the latter part of 1951, the raising
of the discount rate followed soon after a fall in reserves after a sharp
rise. In late 1953 a.nd in 1954, when reserves were only starting to rise
from a low level, the discount rate was lowered a few times, whereas
in 1955, when reserves were rising fast to much above previously main-
tained levels, the discount rate remained stable. On the whole, then,
the proposition that the level of foreign-exchange reserves—as distin-
guished from the direction of change—fulfilled a significant role in
determining the movements of the discount rate must be rejected.
The two "penalty rates" (not shown in Chart 5-1) may be seen to
have played a supporting role to the basic discount rate: the move-
ments of the former were always in the same direction as those of
the latter. The penalty rates seem to be important mainly during 1957—
59, when their movements and the basic discount rate conform to
the requirements of balance-of-payments adjustment: the penalty rates
were raised (the second, in effect, only introduced) during 1957 and
the first half of 1958, when external reserves were falling; lowered
slightly during the second half of 1958, when the balance of payments
stabilized; and lowered considerably during 1959, when reserves were
rising rapidly.FRANCE 107
The movement of the basic rediscount quotas shows, as Chart 5-1
indicates, a slight upward trend most of the time. The increase in the
quotas was very sharp during 1952. External reserves were, indeed,
rising during that year, but this rise was only slight, and is not likely
to have been the proper explanation for the increase in the quotas. The
other deviation from the trend—a substantial decline in the quotas
during the second half of 1957—is more significant; and it conforms
to the movements of the basic discount rate and the penalty rates, and
to the requirements of balance-of-payments adjustment during that
period.
The floor regulations for the holding of Treasury paper (not shown
in Chart 5-1) do not seem to fulfill any independent function. From
the introduction of those regulations to the end of 1960 the floor ratio
was stable, except for the previously noted change in structure, and
consequently in its "marginal" level from 20 to 25 per cent, in 1956.
On the other hand, as has been mentioned earlier, since the introduc-
tion of a more inclusive reserve ratio in 1961, the floor regulations
have been of little relevance to over-all monetary policy. The reserve
ratio, which was stable during 1961, increased in number of steps from
early 1962 to the middle of 1963, then decreased from late 1964 to
the end of 1965. All these changes took place during the period of a
consistent, large rise of external reserves, and cannot thus be explained
by the position of the balance of payments. In a rough way, they cor-
responded to changes in the same direction in the discount rate, and
were, presumably, intended to reinforce discount-rate policy during
these years.
Substantial changes in the amount of the Bank of France's lending
to commercial banks clearly were opposite in direction to changes in
external reserves, as may be seen from Chart 5-1 and from column
3 of Table 5-1. These movements in the Bank's lending to commercial
banks appear to be related to three factors: the movement of external
reserves, discount policy, and Bank of France lending to the govern-
ment. Commercial-bank borrowing from the bank, generally rather
stable, rose substantially during 1951 and from the end of 1955 to the
middle of 1957, both of which were periods of substantial declines in
external reserves. From mid-1957 to the end of 1958, the amount of
such borrowing was stable, although foreign reserves were still falling
sharply. This must have been due, first, to the discounting policy,
which became restrictive during this period, and, second, to a substan-
tial increase in the Bank of France lending to the government. It mayio8DEMAND POLICIES AND BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
be assumed that a fall of the latter during 1956 was a contributing fac-
tor to the rise of borrowing by commercial banks that year. In 1959,
with the sharp increase in external reserves, commercial-bank borrow-
ing from the Bank of France declined, despite the reduction of the
discount rates. During 1952—55 and from 1960 onward, when external
reserves were rising substantially, the commercial banks' borrowing
was roughly stable. Given the fact that the commercial banks' lending
to the public increased continuously during these periods, it is clear
that the rise of external reserves relieved commercial banks from the
need to resort to from the Bank of France as a means of
financing this credit expansion. In sum, therefore, the relationship be-
tween external reserves and Bank of France lending was unmistakable:
a fall of the former led to an increase in the latter, while a rise of
the former brought a fall, or prevented a rise, in the latter. In France,
as in other countries, the "automatic" disadjusting effect of commercial
bank borrowing from the central bank clearly seems to be operative.
Fluctuations in Bank of France claims on the government, on the
other hand, apparently have no consistent relation to the balance of
payments, as may be gathered from Chart 5-1 and from column 4
of Table 5-1. The most important movement of disadjusting nature
took place during 1957, when this lending increased while external
reserves were falling, but a positive correspondence between the move-
ments of the two variables is found on other occasions, until about the
middle of 1961. From then on, claims on the government, while some-
times fluctuating, have been relatively stable, while external reserves
have risen rapidly.
The movement in total domestic claims of the Bank of France—
which is primarily the combination of the previous two components—
seems to follow the same trend as the Bank's lending to commercial
banks. The result, as Chart 5-1 and column 5 of Table 5-1 show, is
that such changes are largely in a disadjusting direction. This holds
true both for shorter-term movements and for longer-term trends: at
the end of 1958, external reserves were on the same level as in 1950
(while fluctuating mildly between those years), whereas the Bank of
France's total domestic assets increased appreciably over that period;
from 1959 to 1966, on the other hand, the latter variable remained
stable, or even declined slightly, while external reserves rose substan-
tially. The inverse relationship frequently observed between a cen-
tral bank's foreign assets and its domestic assets is clear in the case of
France.FRANCE 109
Data on lending by commercial banks to the public, presented in
Chart 5-1(i.e., commercial bank private claims), are available only
from 1953 and thus do not cover earlier instances of imbalance. But
in subsequent years—which comprise most of the total period—the
amount of commercial-bank lending does not seem to be related in any
consistent way to imbalances of payments. The rate of expansion of
credit was rather stable throughout, and averages for subperiods are
very similar to each other. The only important deviation from the
average trend occurred fromthe middle of 1957 to the end of 1959,
when credit expansion was particularly low. This covers a period when
external reserves fell sharply during 1957; a period when they fell
slightly during most of 1958, and a period when they increased sharply
during 1959. The decline of the rate of expansion of credit during
1957—58 was probably due to the restrictive measures of those years
(including the direct control of credit during 1958), which measures,
in turn, were most probably taken as a response to the imbalance of
payments. But this single episode—followed immediately by a reverse
relationship in 1959—would not allow one to conclude that com-
mercial-bank lending showed a regular response to imbalances of pay-
ments.
It is worth noting, however, that during the long period, of uninter-
rupted accumulation of external reserves in the 1960's, the rate of
expansion of commercial-bank lending does seem to be correlated, in a
rough way, with the rateofexpansion of reserves. Thus, if this period
is divided into two—1960—62 and 1963 through the third quarter of
1 966—changes in these two variables between the two subperiods ap-
pear to be similar. The quarterly rate of expansion of external reserves
declined from 7.6 per cent in 1960—62 to 3.4 per cent in 1963—66,
while the rate of expansion of commercial-bank lending fell from 4.8
per cent to 2.5 per cent. The particularly fast expansion of credit
during the early 1960's might have come about without the rapid
accumulation of external reserves, but this accumulation enabled the
banks to maintain the rapid credit expansion without borrowing from
the Bank of France. During 1963—66, on the. other hand, credit expan-
sion was restricted by direct control measures. It is sometimes argued
that these restrictions were due to the declining balance-of-payments
surpluses and the declining rate of accumulation of external reserves.
If this is true, credit policy during this period would appear to be
responsive to balance-of-payments fluctuations in a manner which as-110DEMAND POLICIES AND BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
sumes not balance-of-payments equilibrium, but a given, high rate of
accumulation of external reserves to be the external target.
Money supply clearly seems to respond to changes in external re-
serves in an adjusting manner. This may be observed from Chart 5-1
and from column 6 of Table 5-1. The rate of expansion of money
supply was, almost invariably, positively related to the movement of
reserves. The only exception is the subperiod 1952, when the rate of
increase of money supply fell and external reserves increased slightly.
Table 5-3presentsepisodes in which the rate of expansion of money
supply deviated markedly from its trend; that is, the expansion was
particularly fast or particularly slow (it was practically never nega-
tive). It may be seen that, until .1960, such episodes could be explained
by the need for balance-of-payments adjustment much better than by
other targets. From 1960 onward, on the other hand, none of the
targets appears to provide a good explanation of the developments in
this instrument variable.
Like the amount of credit, money supply in the 1960's appears to be
related to the rate of accumulation of external reserves: between
1960—62 and 1963—66 the quarterly rate of expansion of money sup-
ply fell from 3.8 per cent to 2.6 per cent. This association is almost
inevitable: of the three major factors which contribute to the creation
TABLE 5-3
FRANCE: SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN MONEY SUPPLY
AND POSITION OF TARGET VARIABLES
Rate of IndustrialCost-of-Living
. Increase ofExternalProduction Index







II1951 —II1952 low + fall + high + high
i1956 —iii1958 low + fall * normal * fluctuates
m1958 —in1960 high + rise * normal* normal
z1961 —iv1961 low — rise * normal* normal
iv1961 —iv1962 high + rise * normal+ low
j1964 —iv1965 low — rise — low — low
NOTE: For explanation of symbols, see Chapter 3, explanatory note.FRANCE III
of money, the stock of the central bank's net lending to the govern-
ment was found to be rather stable during the 1960's, while the rate
of expansion of commercial-bank credit and the rate of accumulation
of external reserves—the other two major factors which determine
money supply—moved, as has just been observed, in the same direc-
tion. The association of the rate of increase of money supply with the
rate Df accumulation of external reserves during the 1960's is similar
to its aforementioned association with credit supply.
Movements of the budgetary deficit, which are represented in Chart
5-1 and in column 7 of Table 5-1, do not seem to have any consistent
relationship to imbalances of payments. This would also be true if the
deficit were calculated not in absolute terms but, say, as a ratio of the
size of the budget, or of the national product. As has been explained
before, the size of the budgetary cash deficit in France does not repre-
sent the government's excess demand for goods and services. Since
data on this excess demand are not readily available, no presumption
about itsrelationshipto balance-of-payments adjustment can be
offered. From Table 5-4, which lists episodes in which the budgetary
deficit was clearly rising or falling, it appears that no alternative target
could explain the movements of the budgetary deficit. A comparison of
columns 4 and 7 in Table 5-1, or the corresponding series in Chart 5-1,
will also show no consistency in the movements of the budgetary deficit
TABLE 5-4
FRANCE: THE BUDGETARY BALANCE AND POSITIONS
OF TARGET VARIABLES
IndustrialCost-of -Living











u1951 —ii1953 high * no trend+ low * fluctuates
i1955 —in1956 high * no trend— high + low
m1957 —in1961 low — rise * normal * fluctuates
m1961 —in1963 high + rise * normal * normal
m1963 —xv1965 low — rise — low — low
NOTE: For explanation of symbols, see Chapter 3, explanatory note.112DEMAND POLICIES AND BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
and of the government's borrowing from the Bank of France. This
illustrates the point made earlier, that the government's cash posi-
tion in France is affected significantly by components other than the
budgetary deficits.
3. Summary and Interpretation
In examining policy patterns in France, a distinction should be made
between the 1950's, a period of fluctuations in the balance of pay-
ments, and the 1960's, a period of consistent surpluses and continuous
accumulation of external reserves.
During the 1950's, a consistent response to imbalances of payments
is evident, and a regular pattern emerges. In the event of a deficit or a
fall of reserves, the discount rate is raised. Such changes in the dis-
count rate are the most important measure of over-all discount policy,
which is, in turn, the major instrument of monetary policy. In addition
to the basic discount rate, the penalty rates may also be raised in re-
sponse to the deficit of payments. During the substantial downward
movement of 1957, the discount quota was lowered significantly, as
an added measure. The contractionary discount policy is not associated,
however, with a contraction of commercial-bank borrowing from the
Bank of France. In itself, the discount policy must obviously have
this contractionary effect, as is clearly revealed by the movements of
commercial-bank borrowing which follow the discount policy measures.
But this would only partly offset the tendency of banks to increase
their borrowing from the Bank of France during a period of falling
external reserves, in order to overcome the reduction of their lending
capacity which the fall of reserves must involve. In such a period, com-
mercial banks' borrowing from the Bank of France increases, rather
than diminishes: the rise of demand for this lending more than offsets
the increase in its cost. In France, as in other countries, one encounters
the paradox of increased bank borrowing from the central bank at
times of a rise in the discount rate.
Bank-of-France lending to the government does not seem to respond
in a consistent manner to a balance-of-payments deficit. Movements of
total domestic assets thus tend, following the movement of the Bank's
lending to commercial banks, to be in a disadjusting direction: when
the Bank of France loses external assets its domestic assets tend to riseFRANCE 113
fast,whereas at other times they tend to be stable or to rise only
slowly.
Commercial-bank lending to the public does not reveal any consist-
ent pattern. This, as has just been mentioned, is true also for the Bank
of France's net lending to the government. These two components
participate, along with external reserves, in determining the size of
money supply. Since the first two components do not as a rule con-
tradict the movement of external reserves, the rate of expansion of
money supply is correlated with the latter: in times of declines of re-
serves, this rate falls.
For this period, no asymmetry between upward and downward im-
balances is evident: when external reserves rise, the opposite pattern
appears. Therefore, it may be said that the discount rate—or discount
policy in general—was manipulated, as a rule, in an adjusting direc-
tion. The rate of expansion of money supply also moved in an adjust-
ing direction during this period whereas total domestic assets of the
central bank behaved in a disadjusting manner. The latter phenomenon
conforms to the findings by Nurkse and by Bloomfield on the assets of
the central bank. By the Nurkse criterion, this monetary policy would
then be classified as one which contradicts the "rules of the game." On
the other hand, by the definition which employs the variables of the
discount rate and the money supply, this pattern would be described
as one which follows the "rules" rather consistently.
While consistency of the pattern during the 1950's seems evident, it
cannot be ascertained whether the movements of the policy variables
were indeed a response to the needs of the balance of payments. The
movements, it was observed, could be interpreted almost as well as
being directed by the "domestic" target of price stability. During the
1950's in France, these two targets usually appear to require the same
policy response rather than to have contradicting requirements. This
would suggest, in turn, that balance-of-payments fluctuations were
normally due to changes in internal circumstances—and, presumably,
to internal policy measures—rather than to external changes: balance-
of-payments deficits went along with domestic inflation and price rises,
whereas balance-of-payments surpluses were accompanied by domestic
contraction and price stability.
Unlike monetary policy, fiscal policy does not reveal any consistent
pattern of reaction, either by itself or in some "mix" with monetary
policy. It does nOt appear that this was due to the employment of fiscal
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finding in view of the observation that other targets did not usually
require measures opposite to those intended to bring about balance-of-
payments equilibrium. Fiscal policy might, of course, have been aimed
at some other target not examined in the study. It must also be remem-
bered that data on the cash budgetary deficit, which were used to
identify budgetary policy, may not have been on many occasions even
a good approximation of the size of the government's excess demand.
Thus, it is conceivable that more relevant data, if available, would
have revealed some other pattern.
During the period extending from 1960 or, perhaps, 1959 to the
third quarter of 1966, the pattern is significantly different. External
reserves kept rising during these years at a very substantial rate. A
monetary policy responsive to the need for balance-of-payments equi-
librium should have been generally expansionary. Actual policy might
be interpreted to have been such, but the evidence is not clear-cut. The
discount rate was kept rather stable, instead of being lowered, and the
two slight variations in it cannot be interpreted as having been mo-
tivated by balance-of-payments developments. Moreover, the level of
the discount rate over this period as a whole was not lower than its
average level in the preceding years, as an adjusting policy would have
required. In relation to discount rates elsewhere, on the other hand, the
discount rate does appear to have been lowered. The rate of increase
of money supply seems to be roughly correlated with the rate of
accumulation of external reserves—the two are considerably higher
during 1960—62 than during 1963—66. But the average rate of expan-
sion of money over this period of rising reserves as a whole is roughly
equal to its rate of expansion during 1951—58, when no over-all trend
of increase of external reserves existed. In these years, .the only variable
whose pattern of movement appeared to be similar to that observed for
it in earlier years was the Bank of France's total domestic assets (and
as part of it, the Bank's lending to commercial banks): it remained
stable during the rapid increase of external reserves, while it increased
substantially in the earlier period in which no over-all increase of
reserves took place. This is yet another demonstration of the generally
negative correlation between the two parts of the central bank's assets.
The conclusion that emerges is that monetary policy during this
period was not meant to adjust the upward imbalance of payments.
Nor does fiscal policy seem to have been used for this purpose: the
budgetary deficit for these years was, on the average, smaller even inFRANCE 115
absolute terms than in the earlier period. Claims of alternative targets
which have been examined do not seem to explain this lack of response
of the policy variables. It is conceivable, of course, that other target
variables, not observed here, could provide the explanation. But it
seems more likely that the continuous and substantial accumulation of
reserves during the 1960's was not considered a disturbance which
should be corrected. It might even have been regarded as a desirable
target. The fact that the rates of expansion of money and credit appear
to be roughly correlated with the rate of accumulation of external
reserves gives added credibility to the assumption that a high rate of
accumulation of reserves was indeed a policy target during these years.
In this connection mention should be made of the French devalua-
tions of 1957 and 1958. Both, unlike the changes in the rate of ex-
change in Germany and the Netherlands in 1961, were rather substan-
tial: the first, taken in a few steps during the latter hail of 1957,
brought the rate of exchange from 350 to 420 (old) francs per dollar
—an increase of 20 per cent; and the second, taken at the very end of
1958, raised the rate further to 490 francs per dollar—an increase of
about 17 per cent. The first devaluation was taken at a time when
external reserves were very low and still falling rapidly, and at about
the same time as a contractionary monetary policy was undertaken.
It may certainly be regarded as intended to adjust the balance of pay-
ments. The second devaluation, on the other hand, came at a period in
which a balance had already been achieved. This devaluation might
have been due to a fear that stability was only temporary and further
deterioration likely. While this is a possible explanation, it is not sup-
ported by the fact that, by that time, discount policy had already
become expansionary. It seems more likely that the devaluation was in
fact caused by the low level of reserves, and was intended to raise that
level. It may have been related also to the need to insure the success
of external convertibility, undertaken in conjunction with devaluation.
The situation in France during the 1960's is thus very similar to that
of Germany during the 1950's: the two countries may be said to have
exchanged their roles around the late 1950's. In both situations, a
devaluation (in Germany, that of 1949) is followed by a substantial,
long, and uninterrupted accumulation of reserves; by the yardstick of
maintenance of equilibrium in the balance of payments, the currency is
undervalued. Yet no policy is undertaken to reverse this situation, ap-
parently because it seems desirable. It may also be mentioned that a116DEMAND POLICIES AND BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
remarkable similarity exists between the situation in France during the.
1960's and from 1926 to the early In 1926, too, the rate of
exchange was determined (following a period of a fluctuating rate) at
too high a level, and reserves started to accumulate rapidly.5 Thus, as
in the 1960's, this accumulation was apparently deemed desirable, and
possibly even intended when the rate of exchange was determined.
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Even the developments of the composition of reserves seem to be similar, in
a very rough way, in the two episodes: first came a rise in both foreign exchange
and gold; then the former stabilized, but not the latter; eventually, the amount
of foreign-exchange was reduced, while the amount of gold kept rising at a
rapid rate.